Jev Advisors
ServerFS can optionally use TypeSafe Jev inside the host-side Agent Bridge as a structured decision-support layer.
Jev is a System One model: instead of generating prose, it evaluates typed questions against shared state and returns structured values such as Choice probabilities/confidence and Noul values. ServerFS uses that shape for narrow advisory judgments and keeps deterministic policy in code.
The integration is opt-in, advisory-only, and fail-open. Jev is not an Agent runtime, authorization source, or security boundary.
Status: this opt-in experimental capability ships in v0.6.0. It changes the host Agent Bridge only and does not change the MCP public tool schema.
Enable it
Section titled “Enable it”Set the TypeSafe API key in the repository’s existing untracked .env:
SERVERFS_JEV_API_KEY=<your key>Leave the value empty to disable every Jev feature. When disabled:
- no TypeSafe client is constructed;
- no Jev network request is made;
- Agent submission and approval behavior follow the non-Jev path.
The installer renders a configured key only into the user-owned Agent Bridge config with mode 0600. The key is not passed into the MCP container.
Current model contract
Section titled “Current model contract”ServerFS currently pins:
jev-1.13.0typesafe-sdk==0.7.1The version is pinned instead of using jev-latest so evaluation behavior can be calibrated and reproduced before deliberately moving to a newer model.
TypeSafe currently documents Jev 1.13 as text-only with a 64k total request budget and an additional 32k limit for the state plus the single longest question. English is its strongest language; CJK is supported but should be validated on the application’s own data. ServerFS therefore treats all scores and recommendations as evidence, never as authority.
Three advisory capabilities
Section titled “Three advisory capabilities”Agent Task Preflight
Section titled “Agent Task Preflight”Every Jev-enabled submit_agent_task can evaluate:
- whether the prompt is one narrow objective;
- whether mutation scope is explicit;
- whether stop conditions are explicit;
- whether verification evidence is explicit;
- whether the task fits structured ServerFS primitives or a native Agent.
Runtime Router
Section titled “Runtime Router”The same task-submission Jev request also recommends one route:
direct_serverfs_toolcodexclaudehuman_review
This does not add runtime=auto. The explicitly requested runtime and deterministic per-workdir runtime policy remain authoritative.
Approval Advisor
Section titled “Approval Advisor”If Codex or Claude later produces a real provider approval request, ServerFS may make one additional Jev request for that concrete approval.
It evaluates:
- necessity for the authorized objective;
- whether scope is bounded;
- destructive or irreversible risk;
- sensitive access;
- external side effects;
- an advisory recommendation such as
approve_once,approve_session,deny,cancel_task, orreview_carefully.
The provider request remains blocked until the caller explicitly responds through the existing approval tool. Jev never resolves the approval itself.
Request economy
Section titled “Request economy”ServerFS deliberately minimizes Jev traffic:
submit_agent_task └─ 1 Jev request ├─ Preflight └─ Runtime Router
provider approval? ├─ no -> 0 extra Jev requests └─ yes -> 1 approval-specific Jev request └─ identical approval in the same task -> reuse cached advicePreflight and Runtime Router share one system_one request because Jev can evaluate multiple typed questions independently against the same state. Approval Advisor runs later only because the concrete provider approval object does not exist at task-submission time.
Data minimization
Section titled “Data minimization”ServerFS does not send the workdir contents to Jev just because the advisor is enabled.
Task-level evaluation receives the submitted task context needed for the advisory questions. Approval evaluation uses the existing redacted approval object, restricts it to an allowlisted field set, and applies another sanitizer for obvious secret/token/password/credential fields and patterns.
No Jev result may weaken:
- workdir/path authorization;
- runtime allowlists;
- writer leases;
- native provider approval semantics;
- MCP transport/network isolation;
- provider safety checks.
Failure behavior
Section titled “Failure behavior”If TypeSafe is unavailable, times out, rate-limits the request, or returns an unexpected result, the advisor reports status=unavailable.
The already-authorized Agent task or pending provider approval continues through the normal ServerFS path. Jev failure does not fail open into broader authority; it only removes advisory context.
Evaluation status
Section titled “Evaluation status”The current integration has been live-tested with:
- bounded filesystem reads;
- Git/test tasks;
- explicit Codex/Claude provider mismatches;
- human-review decisions;
- intentionally bundled or vague prompts;
- bounded one-time writes;
- repeated session-scoped writes;
- outside-workdir approval requests.
The project intentionally does not use automatic routing or automatic approval thresholds yet.
Upstream references: Introduction, Models, and API reference.
For implementation and measured examples, see the repository notes: